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SOCIAL CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: GENERAL 
TRENDS AND NATIONAL PATTERNS1
 
By László CSABA2  
 
ABSTRACT: The  paper addresses five issue areas. First it describes the plurality of  
trajectories in central and eastern European transformations, offering a broad typology. 
Then it addresses the drift between  acceptance of democracy and the market, owing 
to growing inequalities. Third, problems of poverty and exclusion are addressed. 
Fourth, it is addressed if any known model of redistribution emerged in the post-
transition economies. Fifth, consequences of the populist turn in European policies are 
being analyzed. Influences of the EU practices will be dealt with and  some 
preliminary conclusions drawn. These suggest a strong intertwining between social 
and economic performance that limit theoretically conceivable – neoliberal, social 
democratic, postmodern or conservative - policy choices. 
 
                *          *            *          *            *             *                *              *  
 
This paper offers a political economy perspective on social change. As it can be 
documented in greater detail/Csaba, 2007, Gligorov,Podkaminer, et.al,, 2006/ socio-
economic change in the  by now 30 post-Communist countries has not followed any 
common pattern. By contrast, the  defining  feature of  change since 1989 has been  
one of diversification, where very long patterns of  social organization, factor 
endowments, policies, institutions, interaction with the EU or the lack of it, the inflow 
of foreign direct investment/FDI/ or the lack of it, as well as social learning have put 
together  such a mix, that defied any ex ante theoretical expectations. In a way the 
four, five or seven decades of Communist experience has proven to be an interlude, 
that is gradually but definitely losing its relevance in explaining the development 
potential and actual pattern of the states concerned. 
 
Social change has been shaped to a decisive  degree  by economic change, but not 
least also by the discourse about the nature and the consequences of these. Though the 
interaction of the two is a subject of dispute, and so is the role of ideational factors in 
bringing about actual patterns of  change, statistical evidence  allows for  grouping the 
post-Communist countries in four major categories. These  do not necessarily overlap 
with the usual self-characterization of nations, nor does it follow  the choices made by 
the international organizations. However the  deeper and more detailed analysis of 
statistical evidence  conducted in the sources cited above, as well as  produced by the 
regular surveys of the Economic Commission of Europe and  the Transition Reports 
of the EBRD in London would perhaps allow for the structuring presented  below. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  This article is based on a paper presented to the international conference of the Hans- Böckler- 
Stiftung entitled ’Welfare States in Central and Eastern Europe’, 4-6 October,2006, Hattingen, 
Germany. Useful comments on previous versions by Dóra Győrffy/University of Debrecen/ and Béla 
Greskovits aznd Zdenek Kudrna/CEU/, Ute Klammer/FH Mönchengladbach/ and Attila Bartha/Kopint-
Datorg Economic Research/ are appreciated, with the usual caveats. 
 
2 Professor of Economics and European Studies, Central European University, Budapest and Chair, 
Committee on  Economics, The Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
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Divergent Transition  Termini 
 
Post-Communist countries can be divided into two major and two lesser categories. 
One of them are those of „emerging Europe”, i.e countries where the classical tasks of  
stabilization, liberalization, institution building and privatization have, by and large, 
been mastered. While  several of the third  generation reforms, such as of pensions, 
rural development, environmental management,  reorganization of infrastructure and  
the pattern of provision of social services, in short: welfare state reform is stagnant, in 
the past few years often stuck, the foundations of an open economy and open society 
have been lain.  These countries are already members of the EU since 2004, which 
provides them  a source of inspiration and committment, via the soft law and the 
processes often  described as Europeanization, i.e the interaction between local and 
EU policies and institutions.  
                                                                                                                                            
The second group consists of  countries of the New Independent States/NIS and 
southeast Europe, who have not joined the EU in 2004. In the latter group foundations 
for sustainable development, as distinct from  resource-based growth generated by 
windfall revenues of various sorts, have not been created. Nor have been the 
foundations of an open society  cemented, with authoritarian methods of control 
and/or criminalization of socio-economic structures despite seemingly  similar 
formal/European-type of institutions have been a fact of life for anybody having 
visited these  countries. The level of economic activity, the pattern of exports, as well 
as the pattern of employment all  point to the same direction, making the second 
group dissimilar from the first. This is particularly manifest in large and often 
growing share of agricultural employment, reaching 25 plus per cent of the total, 
reflecting the limited or even regressive modernization and survival strategies of the 
199os. With several million people  having returned to rural subsistance farming 
conditions for a knowledge-based society and of continuous learning, the spread of 
the IT revolution and overcoming  the digital divide, and ensuing marginalization and 
limited employability have not been created.  
                                                                                                                                      
The de-modernizing survival strategies, that influenced the lives of  substantial 
segments of the population, showing up 10-15 percentage points in marco-statistics, 
have also adversely influenced  female employment and carreer prospects. With the 
revival of the traditional rural houshold pattern, a number of services and 
commodities previously purchased, started to be  domestically produced again. This is 
particluarly visible in some cases, such as caring about the elderly and the young, but 
also in producing  daily neccessities and  construction activities of various sorts. But 
also at the other end of the spectrum the spread of the traditional role models, 
allowing for early withdrawal from the labor market, could be observed. It is worth 
noting: EU membership, on its own right, may not change these patterns, as the 
experience of Ireland and Greece in the 1980s or of Portugal in the 1990s has already 
amply demonstrated. Likewise, the recurring reform fatigue of core EU states would 
caution us from the widespread over-emphasis on the  potential influence of  Union 
membership on the domestic evolution of any member-state, old or new, in the longer 
perspective.  
 
Also within each of the two major  categories two sub-groups can be distinguished.  
In the group of emerging Europe  the four Visegrád countries form one unit, where 
structural and institutional modernization  have triggered synergies in the economic 
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and social planes alike. In the economy these countries have continued to improve 
their export patterns, actually even  beyond the levels of the south European EU 
members, and move towards post-industrialism in terms of value creation and 
employment alike. The share of agriculture, both in exports and in its contribution to 
GDP, has been on the steady decline.The contribution of agricutlure and fisheries to 
GDP, according to ECB: Statistics Pocket Book, August,2006p.46/Frankfurt a.M/ is 
between 2.9 per cent in the Czech Republic and 4.9 p.c in Poland, i.e broadly 
comparable to several old EU states,such as Ireland/2.5 per cent/ or Greece/5.2 per 
cent/. Also in terms of employment the role of the farming sector, as different from 
other  forms of rural employment, has ben constantly on the decrease.3 Industrial 
productivity and competitiveness has increased over the past decade or so according 
to all evidence at hand.  
 
By contrast the level of economic activity in the  quickly growing economies of the 
Baltics have only recently- by 2005- regained their pre-crisis output levels, at least 
according to the more optimistic calculations4. This is a severe problem, even if 
structural change may render any longer run comparison of questionable value. 
Employment levels of the  countries  have  barely increased in the 2001-2005 period 
acording to the same source. And while their unemployment levels  have been  quite 
low – 4.9 per cent in Estonia, 5.4/ in Lithuania and 7.6 in Latvia/ECB: op.cit.p.41/, 
this does not reflect the  real situation of the Russian speaking population, which is 
deprived of citizenship, thus of  possibilities for  representing their interests in  the 
formal political process. Also sizable migration/adding up to 5 p.c. of local citizens 
according to the soruce above/ has contributed to easing of the social strains ensuing 
from economic change in the Baltics in recent years. Similarly, a more detailed  
analysis of the export patterns of the  Baltics showed, already in the late 199os, a 
tendency  to focus  on primary commodities, re-exporting  Russian fuels, wood-
cutting, textiles and othe low skill industries/Freudenberg and Lemoine,1999/. In 
short,  the dynamics of GDP is largely attributable to low starting levels, and  for the 
long run, such components of lasting competitiveness, as R+D intensive activity and  
upgrading of industrial exports are not easy to spot/Lankhuizem,2ooo/. The drift 
between the capital city and the  backward rural areas is by no means a new 
phenomenon, still often overlooked by persons visiting the tiny states for a few hours 
only. The ongoing structural weakness of Baltic exports has foreshadowed some of 
the structural weaknesses of these economies  already several years 
ago/Csaba,2002,pp61-62/. Thus  the inability of both Estonia and Lithuania to join the  
euro-zone as planned in the late  spring of 2006, and Latvian hesitation along the 
same line is a clear indication that  press reports and the ensuing public perception of 
the „Baltic Miracle” might have been premature5. Owing to the sustainingly  big 
inequality of income and wealth/both along ethnic lines and via the urban-rural 
divide/ poverty may well sustain for long, even amidst impressive rates of GDP 
growth. 
 
                                                          
3 However, it is still sizable, in the case of Poland, Croatia and Romania it was over 17 p.c in 
2005.Source: Eurostat: Labor Force Survey,2oo5./published on September 11, 2006/. 
4 Koipint-Datorg: Konjunktúrajelentés/Report on the Business Cycle/.Budapest, no.2/July. The UN 
Economic Survey of Europe in Geneva has yet to come up with comparable data for the comparable 
period. 
5 For a similarly skeptical assessment, based on differently conceptualized  weaknesses of export 
patterns see Greskovits/2004,esp.pp222-223/. 
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Also within the  second major group two sub-groups may be  distinguished. In the 
New Independent States, when the period of  state formation and Soviet disintegration 
has come to a halt by 1999, a new type  of  growth emerged. This is, at the end of the 
day, a resource-based  growth,  known from the analysis of the MidEast and other 
petro-states/Karl, 1997/. In short, this pattern  is shaped by the  windfalls that accrue 
to the government from the  lavish availability of  natural resources and  from the  
global price increases, that happen mostly owing to factors that are beyond their 
control. Thus the government of the day benefits from the  dollar spree, which has  
two  probable  consequences. In one scenario this cements existing structures and 
allows for  the „eternal” postponement of the institutional, political, social and 
economic reforms that otherwise would be necessary.                
                                                                                                                                              
In the alternative scenario, theorized by Ross/1999/ the fight for resources escalates 
into a civil war. In this  approach resources are by no means assets, but curses for the 
population, as the fight for their control leads to the disintegration of the central state. 
The former trajectory, leading to the  strengthening of authoritarian rule, is clearly 
observable in Russia and  central Asia. The latter trajectory is also  observable, mostly 
in failed states, such as in Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Ivory Coast or Sierra Leone, more 
recently in Iraq and potentially in Kyrgyzstan and elswhere in the region. Summing 
up, in this group growth is though high and sustaining, as long as  growth of relative 
energy prices can be taken for granted for longish periods, due to geological reasons 
that lead to peaking of oil supplies/Bárdossy and Lelkes-Felvári 2oo6/. However the 
social consequences are  not unambiguous and the trickle down of  wealth is by no 
means ensured. 
 
The second sub-group consists of  southeastern Europe. Here the  decade-long 
Yugoslav disintegration, which has not yet come to its end at the time of writing/with 
the  international legal status os Kosovo being unclarified and with the quasi-state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina still living on aid dependence, and that at a low level/ has had  
lasting ramifications.  
 
First, the decade of the 90s, when the SLIP agenda in  emerging Europe has been, by 
and large, mastered, was spent on fighting. In those countries where  no civil war took 
place, the fight within various clans/factions of the elite has created an environment of 
lastingly low trust and  permanent divisions. The non-Communist  clans/factions have 
proven, at the final account, equally susceptible to corruption, clientelism and 
intertwining with informal, maffia-type  groups. While the nature of the issue is such 
that direct proofs as accepted in analytical social science  were hard to produce, the  
extreme phenomena, such as the slaughter of Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic in 2002, 
or the  accusations of  criminal and  other  activities levelled agaist  President Basescu  
and the ruling parties in the Romanian press during 2006 are just the tip of the iceberg. 
What we can establish, despite the surrounding secrecy and the heavy burden of proof, 
it that conditions for  creating a trustworthy state, that is shown to  be a crucial 
component for successful development in the long run/Kornai and Rose-Ackerman, 
eds, 2004/ have certainly not been created.   
 
For this reason it is relatively easy to conceptualize, that  conditions for long run 
savings in domestic curency, as well as the ensuing  conditions for financial 
intermediation, finally the  sustainingly high rates of investment, needed for  lasting 
economic growth have not been created. As the recent  analytical piece of the World 
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Bank/Broadman et al, 2005/ has documented in detail, none of the three basic 
conditions, i.e savings-financial intermediation-investment chain has been brought 
about by the changes of the past 15 years. In turn, conditions for sustaining growth, 
that would be able to create  more employment, that would be the prime task of the 
region/cf below/ is unlikely to come about. 
 
If this is the case for  all of the countries in the region - with the obvious differences, 
that might be listed at will, are rather that of  degree, rather than of kind – are unlikely 
to be fundamentally changed/altered, only because of being admitted in the European 
Union. This has to do with at least two major factors. First, the  EU itself has ben 
undergoing a deep crisis where major deficits of implementing existing legislation  
has become observable in the 2003-2006 period. Second, as  indicated above, the 
domestic patterns of power and economic institutions in southeast Europe have taken 
a fundamentally different path than that of emerging Europe, i.e the new members 
admitted in 2004. For this reason, even if  the previous point  would not apply, an 
implementation deficit were to be expected.   
 
This applies a fortiori insofar as  acquis screening and taking over EU legislation in 
the  countries acceeding in 2007 and later, has been rather formal and lukewarm. This 
circumstance has been  brought to public by several sessions of the European 
Parliament and  the Regular Reports of the Commission  alike. Still, with the set 
accession date of 2007, basically implied in the 2002 Copenhagen compromise on 
enlargement, has proven counterproductive. It has robbed the EU from a trumpf card 
it could skilfully play in the process of accession negotiations with central European 
countries, in deeply involving itslef  in the process of domestic institutional change, to 
the benefit of both/Csaba, 2004/. This opportunity has been clearly missed  in the case 
of Bulgaria and Romania, perhaps also in Croatia, and even more so according to 
what we know of Turkey/though the latter is a long run project anyway/. In other 
words, it can be forecast, that the new members are likely to become the Greece or 
Portugal of the EU, rather than the Ireland or Finland of the future. 
 
 
Capital Income, Inequality, Activity Levels   
 
It follows from the above sketchy summary of economic trends that  some major 
factors shaping societal developments  are likely to differ in the four country 
groups.In the countries of emerging Europe, with the exception of Poland and 
Slovakia, unemployment levels are below the EU average, and activity levels can, at 
least in theory, be enhanced by  well targeted policies. This entails a combination of 
liberalization, education and  enterpreneurial support, as envisaged in the annual 
national plans of the implementation of the re-launched Lisbon program. These 
national  plans, reflecting employment and regional policies and  educational 
measures, are regularly being submitted to Brussels for review ever since  the summer 
of 2oo6. Thus these allow for a functional, rather than ministerial, analysis of the  
trends and policies of the respective states. 
 
The re-launched Lisbon Program rightly  emphasizes the need for growth as a 
precondition for more employment. Under this angle the slowdown of growth in the 
Visegrád countries and the sustaining low level of  economic output in southeast 
Europe is a cause for concern. Likewsie the  pattern of resource-based growth is 
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known to be capital intensive. Unless a major expansion of servicing activities occurs, 
which requires inter alia a broad middle class, low employment activity levels are 
unlikely to change. This is a problem for the second and the third subgroup. Last but 
not least, wherever insider dominance occurs, be that due to the remnats of the 
Yugoslav self-managing firm, or  owing to managerial ownership, dominating the 
political capitalisms of the NIS, unemployment levels are likely to overshoot 
significantly what monetarists would consider the natural rate of unemployment, 
which is put currently around 4 per cent in the USA. While  the EU numbers of 8.1 
per cent is about the double of this  value, the 17-20 per cent levels in southeast 
Europe are truly frightening, from the economic and social perspectives alike. 
 
Being out of work, especially for a long time, is a major determinant of  social 
exclusion, understood broader than just money earning activity. For understandable 
reasons persons without formal employment tend to be marginalized in more than one 
respect. Female employment in this respect suffered perhaps more, and new forms of 
employment, such as part time work, have been resisted not only in the private sector, 
but  by state employers as well. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum we  have to consider  capital income and wealth 
accumulation, despite the  enormous statistical uncertainties surrounding reporting of 
both. It goes without saying that the emergence of large scale capital, massive wealth 
in private hands, especially at times of  long economic - transformational and 
disintegrative – recessions  have turned the previously egalitarian  societies into  quite 
unequal ones. This might explain why political parties in the region tended to identify 
themselves with democracy, not however, with capitalism/Laki,1991/. And although 
at the level of social theory one may doubt if such a distinction is either coherent or 
meaningful, reality has been different. Ever since the onset of transition the double 
talk survived. This circumstance reflects  the limited  legitimacy of the market as 
opposed to democracy. 
 
From the point of view of social dynamics, several considertions may be due. First, 
once we accept the insights of Nobel winner Kahnemann and Krueger/2oo6/ about 
empircal observations of human nature, this is no longer surprising. Empirical tests of 
Kahneman conducted decades ago have already shown, that  contrary to econometric 
models, the subjective feelings of loss versus gain are not symmetrical. Losing 1oo 
euros is about twice as intensive a feeling than gaining the same amount. For this 
reason, as we may add, gains in the economy are easily accepted, while losses, even 
temporary ones, produce  disgruntlement.  
 
Under this angle this is anything but surprising the  rather general disillusionment 
with the growing inequalities that follow from the nature of any capitalist system. For 
one, public perceptions tended to expect  the delivery of the promises of the ancien 
regime. For another, the ideology of transition was that of a Schumpeterian mold, 
with enterpreneurs of various sorts  finding their ways to  implementing their ideas. 
By contrast, especially the farther East we go, the conversion of political advantages 
to economic positions has been the name  of the game. One may rightly invoke the 
experience of east Asian  state capitalism, where – starting with the Meiji restauration 
- the conversion of political status into economic advantage has been anything but 
exceptional. Still, the  expectation of the emergence of some sort of a Scandinavian 
model based on both efficiency and eaquality has been the formative  set of values all 
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across the region. Whatever is the reason for this  mismatch, the fact of the matter 
remains, that  in most of the transition economies the former ruling elite, capitalizing 
on both  its  positional advantage and the monopoly on information, as well as on its  
exceptional position  vis-a-vis foreign investors,  has become the driving focre of 
transformation. By the same token the political and economic component of systemic 
change  have become detached for longish period of time. 
 
The nature of early capital accumulation has been such  - all across economic history -
that its qualities have little resemblance to the Scandinavian model, itself an outcome 
of peculiar circumstances. As a consequence,  in CEE the  drift between expectations 
and realities  has developed into a major schism. At one level, early capitalism has 
shown its ugly face, as known from the classical British,French,German and Russian 
belletristique of the 19-20th centuries. The origin of the first million bucks is not 
something anybody is expected to enquire about in any good company. This, of 
course, has run counter to the expectations of societies, which have internalized to 
some degree the egalitarian socialist state ideology, thus their expectation went 
towards a Scandinavian rather than  wild west type of  market economy. 
 
But the specific  ways of privatization in  the post-Communist region  has also been 
instrumental in  setting the stage. In the first group transnationalization, especially via 
the sell-out of strategic industries and banking, has created a property owner class, 
that is  integrated in the global processes. Also a relatively broad stratum of 
employees of the big firms  emerged. Parallel to this the segment of small and 
medium sized enterpreneurs, as well as the  large mass of  by and large subsistance 
enterpreneurships/in cities and rural areas alike/ have been formed. The lifestyles, the 
economic position of the two, as well as the resultant  value systems are widely 
different. While  in big business  job security  and  income positions approximate 
those in the west, the  small and medium sized sector is suffering from high turnover, 
uncertain regulatory conditions, fierce competition from domestic and foreign 
suppliers, undercapitalization and being non-bankable, as well as from the  very slow 
evolution of the  business-friendly regulatory environment. In sum, while the broad 
middle class, advocated by mainstream social science theory as a backbone of open 
economy and open society has  been in the making, this middle class is internally 
deeply split.6  In a way resembling to  less developed  nations, the dual structure of 
economy and society has emerged, with the  big business transnationalized and small 
business remaining  local, often stagnant. For this reasons macro-aggregates give only 
an indirect picture about societal developments. 
 
In the Baltic states the fundamental problem of societies remained the low level of 
employment, that is coupled with the unresolved citizenship issue of large segments 
of the inhabitants. Deprivation often is cumulative, as Russian speakers tended to be 
employed in large scale industries and  the public administration, both restructured in 
a radical manner already  in the first half of the 199os. 
 
In the New Independent States the resource-based pattern of development  has ben 
twinned with insider-dominted political privatizations. This holds for Russia and 
Ukraine just as much as  for the central Asian countries and  the states of the 
Caucasus. In the latter two groups  successors of the  Communist rulers are either still 
                                                          
6 Certainly, this split – and its cultural cleavages- have long been formative for these societies, at least 
for over the past two centuries. 
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in place/s in Azerbaijan and  central Asia/, or  the „orange revolutions” of 2oo4-2oo5 
have shown a limited impact as yet in terms of redrawing the social map and the 
balance of forces. In the NIS therefore  negative synergies could be observable, 
insofar as  insider privatization and  resource windfalls have  mutually reinforced one 
another, allowing for authoritarianism to  return to a degree and in forms that seemed 
inconcievable during the Yeltsin Presidency. While  some observers compare these 
development to east Asian models of industrialization/Hanson and Teague,2oo5/ thus 
expecting a gradual and inevitable democratization once  societies mature, this  must 
be a very benevolent reading of the events. For one, windfalls create counter-
incentives to change rather than funds for reform – this has been the clear experience 
of petro-states over the past three decades. On the other hand,  analysis of Russian 
reforms to date/Voigt, 2006/ has not found any evidence for the favorable impact of 
institutional changes that were instituted during  both Putin Presidencies. The 
dependence of Russia on the fuel and energuy complex has  increased despite 
government  programs to the contrary, with energy utilization remaining low. Under 
this angle conditions for non-resource based growth and the performance of the non-
resource, i.e modern sectors of the economy have even deteriorated/Bakhmakov,2oo6/.  
 
From the social perspective this has had two major  ramifications. First, owing to the 
windfalls, the Russian  fiscal position consolidated, taking of pressures for change, 
but allowing for paying overdue pensions and wages. This has led, according to 
World Bank estimates/Yemtsov,2005/, to diminishing the share of people living under 
the poverty line of 2.15 dollar a day by about a third in the post-2000 period. Also the 
combination of  centralization of political power with  increased reliance on the 
resource sector has  created  a strengthening of  political capitalism, where the  
boundaries of state and private spheres are lastingly being blurred. This regime, 
according to Latin American experience, does not lend itself to easy reforms. 
Moreover even well-meant  attempts at major institutional change are likely to 
founder on the resistance of vested interest. Dycker/2oo4/ has rightly drawn attention 
to the fact that via political privatizations and partial re-nationalizations a stratum 
deeply disinterested in any  democratization and economic opening has been created 
and even solidified during the Putin Presidencies. This implies a situation where 
rampant shortages and non-payments, i.e features of the disintegration of the  8os and 
9os  no longer exist, but distribution of income and wealth remains grossly unequal. 
The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, politically well connected, who are 
only those oligarchs who accepted the supremacy of the state, complemented by 
political appointees to major  firms and banks, co-exist with the  hardships 
experienced by the small business sector, with their two front fight  against 
bureaucratic arbitraryness and maffia-controls/Glinkina, 2003/.7 In sum, the 
emergence of the middle classes of western type are  not in the making. For this 
reason the  pattern of society, too, is likely to differ from emerging Europe also for the 
long run. What really matters from our perspective is  the  divergence in patters, 
rather than  bits and pieces. 
 
Finally in southeast Europe the low level of economic activity, the criminalization of  
economic and in part also  political  relations, the drift between formal and informal 
structures  turn these societies resemblant to those in the third world. For one, central 
power is often wielded in a rather autocratic fashion, with civic liberties and press 
                                                          
7 A recent killing of a leading central banker, attempting to  undo much of the mafia-type intertwining 
indicated this, as reported in: Wall Street Journal,15 Sept, 2006/online edition/. 
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freedoms, as well as economic freedoms being regularly curtailed. On the other hand, 
and not least following from the previous conditions, incentives to save and invest, 
especially in the long run are not given. Third, involvement of the west, particularly 
of the EU, in reconstructing these societies and  especially in  orchestrating 
institutional change has remained limited. Therefore  neither structural change nor 
economic dynamism is clearly observable. For this reason inequalities of various sorts 
sustain. Political privatization, much resembling to what has ben shown for the NIS, 
has created inequalities and insider dominated, inefficient structures. The same 
mechanisms has been constraining the inflow of FDI, as incumbents have no interest 
in letting their markets become contestable.8 Therefore political capitalism is also in 
search of „national models”, differing in a number of ways but  sharing the inablity 
and unwillingness to transnationalize. For this reason  countries of southeast Europe 
are unlikely to cope easily with the major problem of low  labor market  participation 
ratesl and high open unemployment. As a consequence, even if we were to take  
Serbian, Macedonian or Croatian accession as a given for the next decade, the EU 
would unliklely to be in a position to change these societies for the better form the 
outside. As seen above, structural charachteristics of the past 15 years pose an 
enormous hindrance to the duplication of the  experience of the Visegrád countries. 
 
Poverty, Inequality, Education and Migration 
  
These weighty and complex issues will be  only touched upon for the sake of  
rounding up the big picture only and being aware of the severe limitations in terms of 
methodology and space. However, it is important to bear in mind that  poverty has not 
emerged  with the onset of  capitalism. Contrary to ideological claims and the falsified 
or  classified statistics of the ancien régime, poverty has never been eliminated  under 
Communism. In the case of Hungary  the establishment of SZETA, the Committee for 
the Defense of the Poor in 1978 was an open onslaught on the ideological self-
legitimation and postulates of the  system. It is hardly surprising that the movement 
evolved, with the passage of time, into one of the radical transformative forces of the 
opposition, later  also  the governing radical party of the  Alliance of the Free 
Democrats. Likewise in Poland the KOR, the Committeee of Defense for Workers has 
been instrumental in orchestrating opposition to the Communist dictatorship. 
 
What we know on the base of  empirical studies, from among which  the best known 
for me is  research on Hungary/cf the recent monograph of Tóth,I.Gy.2005/, that the 
old system  did bring about a degree of egalitarianism by introducing the  univeralist 
welfare state, especially since the mid-1970s when public  pensions have been 
extended to the peasantry and  retirement ages were lowered. Also the limitation on 
capital ownership and income, limits on the size of assets that could be privately 
owned  contributed to a compressed income structure, with the top and  bottom 
deciles  showing a 1:4.5 ratio, comparable to Scandinavia. But povery has never 
entirely disappeared, with people living long lives, but forcibly retired in the 1940s 
and 50s, families with several children, persons living in remote and small villages all 
falling under this category. Also single breadwinner households tended to be poor, 
and the Roma, whose integration gathered momentum only in the 1970s were 
regularly overrepresented among the disadvantaged /cf also Andorka et al, 1999/. 
                                                          
8 This is a major difference from the transnationalizing variant, similarly  to the ossification of old 
positions, which has not been the case with the former, as documented on the Hungarian case by/Laki 
and Szalai,2006/. 
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It is common knowledge, that with the emergence of private ownership of assets, as 
well as owing to  the transformational recession many industries and farming 
establishments had to close down. In the case of Hungary about 2 mn out of the 5.5 
mn workplaces in 1988 has disappeared  in a decade. The solution to this  
unprecedented and poorly understood shock  has been manifold/Andorka and Spéder, 
2001/. Early retirement schemes, disabilities, self employment and  withdrawal from 
labor markets all played a role. The latter has been particularly manifest among 
women, with many people benefitting from the lavish child care support schemes of 
GYES and GYED. Also with the passage of time  female employment has become 
growingly difficult, and the conservative turn in societal values  supported/accepted 
the situation where many middle-aged women have not even attempted the impossible, 
i.e of re-entering in the labor market. Many college leavers, especially  from 
humanities and  a number of  related fields actually accepted maternity as a main job. 
The  price hikes in services as well as the divestment of the previously quite extended 
social net, including kindergartens and  care homes, often supported by firms or the 
trades unions, coupled with limited employment availabilities by growingly 
demanding employers/in terms of  working hours and skills alike/ together turned  
return to the labor market quite difficult for many.    
                                                                                                                                         
All in all, Hungary- together with Poland – is a country with one of the lowest rates of 
labor market activity, 57 per cent of the 15-65 years old population- a long way from 
the Lisbon target of 70 per cent. As more detailed analysis/CEMI, 2006/ has indicated, 
this loss is composed of three major factors. 1.People work much fewer years in 
Hungary than in the west, with actual retirement age being only 57 years for men and 
53 years for women/against the statutory  62 and 57 years/.2. Re-employment of 
women is significantly lower than in the EU-15, especially in the 35-55 years cohorts. 
3. Young people spend  too long time  at the expanded  higher education 
establishments, studying for several years  curricula, that  are often of little avail when  
it comes to labor market entry. Also working besides study, a general practice in the 
west, is much less widespread.The overproduction of lawyers, BA level business 
economists, communication specialists, sociologists, philosophers and of course IR 
specialists has become clearly observable, with long waiting months and often  lower 
pay and less demanding jobs than the formal qualification would allow for. 
 
Poverty in central Europe has never reached the dimensions observable in the NIS and 
Southeast Europe. This was due, not least, to the  survival of the social safety net, to 
the relatively  flexible labor markets in some countries, and to the  buffer role played 
by subsistance agriculture and low productivity personal services, including tourism, 
retail trade, construction, insurance and  financial services. While inequality  has 
undoubtedly increased, in the case of Hungary reaching the 1:8 ratio by the turn of the 
millennium and  declining to 1.7.3 by 2005/Szívós and Tóth, eds, 2006/, 
approximating the less equal west European states, but  not reaching Spanish or 
Italian magnitudes, poverty, measured as 1 or 2.15 dollar a day has not attained the 5 
per cent level according to World Bank/World Development Report, 2006,p294-295/. 
By contrast, countries in the NIS and the Balkans have suffered  both in terms of 
inequality and poverty.  
 
What we have described in terms of  the specific state led market models in both 
country groups have aggravated the  unequalizing trends inherent in privatization of 
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any sort. The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and powerful has  been 
aggravated by the decline of overall levels of output, exacerbated by the long and 
slow recovery period. On top of it, ethnic conflict has decisively  added to  the  
problem. In the case of  ex-Yugoslavia titular nations went out of their ways to  
„cleanse” their respective territories, creating  millions of permanently displaced 
persons. Even in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Dayton peace accords would have 
stipulated a multi-ethnic solution under foreign supervision, the return of the  
minorities  has remained fragmentary, the selling off their property being dominant, 
and  ethnically „clean” regions  being cemented. Similar processes can be observed in 
Kosovo and Macedonia, and to a lesser, though not negligible extent, in Croatia and 
Serbia as well9. In the NIS the exodus of the Russian speaking minority, especially 
from central Asia has become massive, triggered  by a combination of spontaneous 
and state sponsored  processes. Russia in the past 15 years has become the largest  
immigration recipient country in terms of the re-settlement of its own countrymen. 
 
The forced re-settlement of millions have created a problem of European dimension, 
where not only the states involved, but the frequented target states of western Europe  
had to react in terms of massive involvement. The presence of  hundreds of thousands 
of  exiles, that add on the top of the serious problem of integration  of migrants from 
Muslim countries, has made  the core EU aware of the problem. However not much 
remedying action followed, not even in terms of  academic thinking and policy advice, 
at least in operational terms/other than the re-training missions of the OSCE, or the  
humanitarian efforts of  aid agencies/.  
 
Education must be included under this heading for a number of reasons. First, as it is 
known from the theory of human capital, education is a core component of the 
employability of the populace in any area. This has to do not only with formal 
provision of degrees, but educating social skills and  foreign languagues. In terms of 
the latter the previously  well performing  secondary and tertiary education of the 
post-Communist countries has suffered a major blow. Underfunding, due to the lack 
of bargaining power in terms of fiscal planning, has been coupled with the expansion 
of higher education in a rather uncontrolled fashion, neglecting  international 
experiences/Polónyi and Tímár, 2006/ has produced  a major deterioriation  in terms 
of  any dimension one cares to mention. 
 
This feature is worrysome, if for no other reason, also in the context of the Lisbon 
Agenda, as relaunched in March 2005, since this policy document rightly emphasizes 
the focal role of  medium and higher education in bringing about „more and better 
jobs”. The less people acquire relevant skills and knowledge, the longer the defensive 
strategy of trying to find employment in poorly paid or subsistance jobs, often in the 
extended irregular economy, that is put at about 40 per cent of GDP in the countries 
of southeast Europe, will become a lasting feature of the economic model. By contrast, 
such an activity pattern  inevtiably leads to low tax revenues and low level of publicly 
provided services. It is easy to comprehend why this structural feature, rather than 
ideational choices/such as the  spread of neoliberalism, exorcised i.a by Joseph E. 
Stiglitz 2002/ in his  public speeches/ is decisive for the outome. From low and  
largely irregular  incomes no long term savings are likely to be made.Even if  cash 
flows were sufficient, uncertainty would caution against  saving in formal financial 
                                                          
9 For current commentary on  these countries cf the regular publications of the International Center for 
Economic Growth: Balkán Monitor, available at: www.iceg.hu  
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intermediaries. Thus  people shun  taxes and also public services as long as they can. 
But – as known i.a from the fate of British and American small business people- old 
age poverty, ill health, or natural catastrophes as the one in New Orleans, not to speak 
of the  presence of  sizable portions of displaced populations, together do not allow 
for the option of the minimal state in the long run. By contrast, unwillingness of 
politicians to create sticks and carrots for more self-care and responsibility will 
backfire, as the tax  abiding behavior is unlikely to spread across the region. 
 
Patterns of Redistribution and Welfare States in CEE 
 
Following the line of overall reasoning we must  relate the economic model to the 
social models that have emerged in the region over the past two decades10. At one end 
we find the  Visegrád countries, where – not least owing to their involvement in the 
process of Eurpeanization – continental types of welfare regimes have been sustaining. 
While the difference  by the country is relevant, it is that of degree rather than of kind. 
In the other part of emerging Europe, the Baltics, a rather US style system has emeged, 
with welfare spending being openly subordinate to considerations of state building 
and of  fiscal equilibrium. One would wonder, for how long this option is likely to 
sustain, provided the high growth of the 2ooos continues, and the ensuing social 
expectations expand, not least via EU channels and through the demonstration effect 
of the Scandinavian/reformed/ welfare states. 
 
In the case of the NIS, the collapse of the socialist enterprises has triggered a real 
crisis. For most of the 1990s not much welfare protection, social safety net in the 
established sense  came to existence. In the first half of the 90s people were nominally 
kept on the payroll, though no actual payment was  transacted.  Later  unemployment 
benefits emerged, but  under high inflation and continued non-payment these became 
irrelevant. Finally  in the 2000s economic growth resumed, that has diminished 
unemployment. The resumption of payment of pensions and wages, even retroactive 
payment of overdues, as seen in section one, has indeed contributed to easing the  
acute problem of third world type of poverty. However, since no extended welfare  
provision has been instituted, and the erosion of the social sphere/also in terms of 
underinvestment/ has been going on for  the fourth decade in the NIS,  while the 
population is ageing in line with the rest of Europe/and birth rates collapsing in the 
Slavic states/, the time bomb of welfare provision is ticking already now. 
 
In the case of southeast Europe  the remnats of the once – at least formally - universal  
socialist welfare provision  co-exist with  ongoing privatization of revenues and 
services alike. The  sizable irregular economy, together with  relatively high inflation 
in all countries but Croatia, render the  real value of those services limited. 
Remittances from guest workers form, like in many developing nations, an important 
component of the social safety net. Also the family/clan provision of some of the 
basic services, normally bought on the market in the west, help to milden the 
repercussions of a decaying formal state structure, or the  slow emergence and 
inefficiency of newly formed state structures in such countries as  Macedonia or 
Bosnia. 
 
                                                          
10 For a possible conceptualization of these models cf the  innovative, though controversial, approach 
of Bohle and Greskovits/2007/. 
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It is relatively easy to forecast that the four  patterns may develop in four trajectories. 
In  the Visegrád countries reforms are likely to follow  the EU model, in which the co-
existence and competition of  Anglo-Saxon and continental models have been 
observable for a long period of time/Aiginger and Guger,2oo6/. In the case of the 
Baltics the  re-introduction of some  of the same is likely to follow economic 
development and Europeanization. In the NIS, at least in theory, the windfall, having 
allowed for the consolidation of public finances, and awareness of the looming crisis 
together may  trigger a step in the direction conceptualized by the  metaphor of 
benevolent dictator. Finally in the Balkans a long  trial and error policy, reminescent 
of the low level equilibrium of countries stuck in the development trap, is likely to 
follow.11As long as the irregular economy can not be combatted, as long as conditions 
for safe savings in local currency are not being brought about by a non-corrupt state, 
these second and third order tasks are unlikely to be met. If for no other reason, than 
the logic of „first things first” can by no means be circumvented. 
 
Consequences of the Populist Turn in Policies 
 
It would be hard to deny that redistributory concerns have become dominant over 
sound macroeconomic policies in most of Europe and in  nearly the whole of the post-
Communist countries. While the rhetoric was  on equity, redistributing the benefits of 
growth, of social security, reality has been quite different. In  most of the countries  
Olsonian redistributory coalitions, mostly  covered by broad modern democratic 
parties, have come to power. These  represented the middle classes rather than 
anybody else, since the marginal groups have normally not been involved at any level 
of policy-making. The exclusion of certain ethnic groups/formally or informally/, or 
the  chastising of the opposition, as in Russia, or the  intertwining of political parties 
of the mainstream with  dubiuos and intransparent business interests, as in Ukraine, 
Romania or Serbia, have  created  a next to ideal breeding ground for the populist 
policies.  
 
One may wonder, how much these processes have been home bred, and how much the 
demonstration effect of the similar practices of core EU countries, regularly flouting 
the  self-imposed Stability and Growth Pact, but also other  norms of solid, 
sustainable public finances have  had a role. Also the ideology of the EU,  that has  
been stressing the social dimension, and extending its soft legislation to areas where  
the Community ha sno formal competences, may have played a role. The EU 
Commission as a policy enterpreneur has advocated policies and institutional 
arrangements, such as tripartism, that  do not follow from the  current  autochtonous 
development of the new member states. 
 
An additional reason that may explain the turn for the worse might have been the  
ebbing out of the influence of the EU as an external anchor and policy enterpreneur. 
The EU had been concieved by the political élite, perhaps in a naive fashion, as a land 
of promise.Thus the EU, and especially the Commission has had much more leverage 
                                                          
11 In a recent publication of the Economist Intelligence Unit: World Investment Prospects. London, 
September .2006  17.5 bn dollars of new inward FDI to southeast Europe is reported. However, these 
relate to one-shot deals, mostly privatizations, both in Serbia/in banking/ and Romania. Similarly,  the 
relatively significant FDI in NIS focuses nearly exclusively on the fuel sector. For Russia the EIU 
forecast of 22 bn for 5 years implies the continuation of the trend of moderate and selective inflows 
that  featured the past 15 years. 
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over the shaping of domestic policies in the  2004 new member states, than it has been 
customary in any of the previous enlargements. Therefore the EU has had  both the 
stick and  the carrot: that of exclusion/from the first round/, and that of  being 
included and lavishly awarded, by sums that may enhance the visibility and popularity 
of the governments administering these funds. 
 
With the 2002 Copenhagen deal both components got lost. The  EU transfers  have 
proven marcoreconomically irelevant, the membership was  secured anyway, and 
trespassers were conspicuoulsy not  punished. This allowed for much laxer policies 
than otherwise. 
 
It is interesting to ask why this  softening up has not resulted in  broad welfare 
reforms, instead of just spending more money in what  many economists consider a 
bottomless barrel. One may well ask, why, if the option has been for more state 
redistribution, why not favoring genuinly the weakest, such as the Roma, the 
population of lagging or environmentally  decaying regions, or even the urban 
underclass including the homeless? But once the political economy perspective, 
informed inter alia by theories of rational choice, is included, the outcome becomes 
much less puzzling.  
 
If we conceptualize the  center-left parties as that of enterpreneurs, representing the 
winners, while the center-right parties as those representing the losers/state dependent 
strata, the drift is given. If it builds upon the drift ofver such issues as how to assess 
the ancien régime, the deep division and distrust in the other part of the élite emerges. 
This triggers an atmpsphere of overall and mutual distrust that renders any non-
myopic, non-materialistic strategy irrelevant, the incentive is to redistribute becomes a 
given.  Elaborating this line of thought Győrffy/2006/ explains Hungarian inability  
for fiscal consolidation on the base of  deep rooted  self-interest of the political actors. 
This model is easy to generalize for the emerging economies except Estonia, where 
reform dictatorship seems to survive. Slovakia could have been different, but  the  
scandals that have led to the downfall of the second Dzurinda Government have  put 
the coutry „back on track”. In the Polish case the  extreme corruption haunting the 
Left and the  hollowing of the moderate center-right/and its  instrumental use of the 
radical vocabulary/, together with normalization of living conditions has brought to 
power the national radicals of the Kaczynski twins, that represent the  moral quest of 
society  to be compensated for the unjustices of the past, that are meant to be 
remedied by increased state redistribution/Smolar,2006/.  
 
It is interesting to note, that despite  nearly two decades of market oriented reforms, 
and in part due to the lack of transparency in public finances, the level of economic 
information and understanding of the population is low, and so is tax awareness. 
Recent surveys of the TÁRKI Institute for Social Research conducted  prior to the 
2006 elections in Hungary has  shown the median voter to  be in favor of tax cuts and 
extended social services, to be implemented at the same stroke/Tóth,I.Gy,2006/. This 
insight may well be generalized to  the rest of emerging Europe12, since  it is 
customary for parties of the left or right to win elections on a similar platform, 
containing at least implicitly those populist promises. Interestingly, both the newly 
                                                          
12 Polish surveys e.g indicated in the mid-2ooos, that rejecting Communism has by no means equalled 
to rejecting collectivist and statist solutions as well. On the contrary, demand for the latter has even 
increased/as reported in Pascall and Kwak,2oo5,pp193-4/. 
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elected  leftist Slovak and rightist Polish governments have  continued a policy of 
redistributing political and economic benefits  within the middle classes/in favor of 
their own supporters and at the detriment of  adversaries/ rather than  being involved 
in any, conceptually well thought-out  reform of those welfare states, whose financial 
unsustainability counts among the  economic platitudes in research on the region. 
 
Under these circumstances educational reforms  rarely follow considerations of 
employability. Rather they follow prestige considerations of regions and local policy-
makers. Radical reforms of the health care systems, launched in Slovakia seem to be 
on the reversal. Privatization of both the Bratislava and Kosice airports have been 
stopped in weeks rather than months after the change.13 In  the other three  Visegrád 
countries  marginal, rather than  major, changes are underway in both pension and 
health care systems.What is truly embarassing for the longer run perspective is the  
low professional level of public discourse over  the welfare state. At one level 
simplistic calls for  all-out privatization, disregarding international experience, on the 
other hand „no change nowhere,else you abolish social accomplishments” define the 
discourse. The acknowledgement of the nature of the problems is often missing. For 
instance, the sustainability constraints of pension systems may be openly doubted14, 
or the  steeply decaying performance of educational systems, reflected i.a in the 
regular PISA tests, is  simply denied. For these reasons the atmosphere has become as 
conservative and status-quo oriented, as in most of continetal Europe - a big 
difference to Scandinavia and the Anglo-Saxon countries, but certainly a given for 
policies.  
 
For this reason  the Visegrád countries, once  in the vanguard of reforming  the socio-
economic systems have entered in a period of muddling through. Much like in many 
Latin American and continental European countries, political and economic 
rationality does not overlap, to put it mildly. Those third generation reforms that 
would address root causes of low employability, social exclusion and  at the end, slow 
trend rates of growth are unlikely to figure high on the agenda of policy reform. 
Marginal changes breed marginal improvements in the frontrunner countries – and 
even a bleaker picture may apply for the laggards. This is  troubling, since social 
modernization is a precondition for further economic growth.  But the theses is easy 
to reverse: further  improved economic performance  creates conditions for  a socially 
more inclusive pattern of the market order than the one that emerged in the past 2o 
years in the four categories of post-Communist countries.  
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